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Quantum cryptography shows that one can guarantee the secrecy of correlation on the sole basis
of the laws of physics, that is without limiting the computational power of the eavesdropper. The
usual security proofs suppose that the authorized partners, Alice and Bob, have a perfect knowledge
and control of their quantum systems and devices; for instance, they must be sure that the logical
bits have been encoded in true qubits, and not in higher-dimensional systems. In this paper, we
present an approach that circumvents this strong assumption. We define protocols, both for the
case of bits and for generic d-dimensional outcomes, in which the security is guaranteed by the very
structure of the Alice-Bob correlations, under the no-signalling condition. The idea is that, if the
correlations cannot be produced by shared randomness, then Eve has poor knowledge of Alice’s and
Bob’s symbols. The present study assumes, on the one hand that the eavesdropper Eve performs only
individual attacks (this is a limitation to be removed in further work), on the other hand that Eve
can distribute any correlation compatible with the no-signalling condition (in this sense her power is
greater than what quantum physics allows). Under these assumptions, we prove that the protocols
defined here allow extracting secrecy from noisy correlations, when these correlations violate a Bell-
type inequality by a sufficiently large amount. The region, in which secrecy extraction is possible,
extends within the region of correlations achievable by measurements on entangled quantum states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum physics has been shown to provide a means
to distribute correlations at a distance, whose secrecy can
be guaranteed by the laws of physics, without any as-
sumption on the computational power of the eavesdrop-
per. This is the nowadays largely studied field of quan-
tum cryptography (or quantum key distribution, QKD),
the most mature development of quantum information
science [1]. The fact itself, that quantum physics can be
used to distribute secrecy, is safe: if the authorized part-
ners share a maximally entangled state, then secrecy is
definitely guaranteed. But of course, one must verify that
secrecy is not immediately spoiled by any small departure
from this ideal case; this is why much theoretical research
has been devoted to the derivation of rigorous bounds for
the security of quantum cryptography [2]. Still, a lot of
questions remain unsolved: for instance, the theorists,
who find security proofs, and the experimentalists, who
realize devices, tend to make different and often incom-
patible assumptions when figuring their schemes out.
In particular, an assumption in theoretical proofs has
gone unnoticed until recently [3,4]: one assumes that the
logical bits are encoded in quantum systems whose di-
mension is under perfect control (generally, qubits). Why
do we question this assumption? First, because it is
interesting in itself to ask, whether one can remove an
assumption, that is, whether one can base the studies
of security on weaker constraints. Second, because side
channels are a serious issue in practical quantum cryp-
tography. Experimentalists have to be careful that, when
they encode (say) polarization, they encode only polar-
ization, and that the device does not change the spec-
tral line, or the spatial mode, or the temporal mode of
the photon as well. Third, because it is important for
practical reasons: quantum cryptography is becoming a
commercial product. If a security expert recommends a
quantum cryptography device, he should be able to as-
sess that the device acts as it should with ”reasonable”
means. After all, the eavesdropper Eve could be herself
the provider of the device!
Anyone faced with this scenario feels at first that, if
Eve is allowed to sell you the devices and you cannot
know them in detail, there is no hope for security. Sur-
prisingly, recent advances in quantum information sug-
gest that this despair, reasonable as it is, may be too
pessimistic. Let’s see where the hope lies, and which as-
sumptions are really crucial.
The scheme to distribute correlations we have in mind
is represented in Fig. 1. In Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories,
the dark grey square represents the device possibly pro-
vided by Eve. The distribution of correlations is made in
three steps. In the first step, both laboratories are open
to the signal that correlate them. This signal comes ei-
ther from outside, or is emitted by Alice’s device to Bob’s,
or viceversa: in any case, it must be assumed to be un-
der Eve’s full control. In the second step, the laboratories
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are completely sealed, an obviously necessary condition
as we are going to see. On the device that reads the
signal, Alice and Bob must have a knob, which allows
them to choose among at least two alternatives (in usual
QKD, this is for instance the choice of the basis). It is
obviously necessary to assume that no information about
the position of the knob leaks out of Alice’s and Bob’s
laboratories (in QKD, if Eve would know the basis, she
can measure the state without introducing errors). Now,
conditioned on the choice of an input (a position of the
knob, labelled x for Alice and y for Bob), an output is
produced (a for Alice, b for Bob). The lists of a and
b constitute the raw key. How can there be some se-
crecy in this raw key? The insight from quantum physics
is that the outputs may be not under the provider’s con-
trol: if the probability distribution of the outputs violates
some kind of Bell inequality, then by definition those out-
puts have not been produced by shared randomness —
in other words, the correlations have been produced by
the measurements themselves, and did not pre-exist to
them. They could have been produced by communica-
tion, if information about the inputs x and/or y would
have propagated between Alice and Bob; but we have
insisted on the no-signalling assumption: no information
about x and y should leak out of Alice’s and Bob’s lab-
oratories respectively [5]. The third step is usual: Alice
and Bob can make classical data processing in order to
distill a fully secret key.
Alice Bob
x
a b
y
FIG. 1. A pictorial description of the no-signalling assump-
tion in our context. The dark grey boxes in Alice’s and Bob’s
laboratories are the devices provided by Eve. In a first step,
the laboratories are open for the signal that correlates them
(grey spheres). The arrows on the channel indicate that it
is not important whether this signal comes from outside, or
is emitted by Alice’s device to Bob’s, or viceversa: in any
case, it is under Eve’s control. What is important, is that
the inputs (x, y) have not been chosen yet. In a second step,
the laboratories are absolutely closed: no leakage of informa-
tion about the inputs (x, y) or the outputs (a, b) is allowed.
In a third step (not shown), Alice and Bob can carry out the
usual procedures of error correction and privacy amplification
by communicating on an authenticated channel.
The reasoning above is exactly the intuition that
led Ekert to discover (independently of previous works)
quantum cryptography in 1991 [6]. Ekert’s work con-
tains in nuce the idea of a device-independent security
proof: it should be possible to demonstrate that a proba-
bility distribution, which violates some Bell inequality, is
secure by this very fact, without any reference to the for-
malism of quantum physics. Of course, in physics as we
know it today, a Bell inequality can only be violated with
entanglement: that is why people immediately used the
quantum formalism to study Ekert’s intuition [7]. But
recently, tools have been developed, that allow one to
study no-signalling distributions in themselves, without
the formalism of Hilbert spaces. It is then possible to
come back to the original intuition by Ekert, and try and
prove security only through the violation of a Bell-type
inequality. This is the theme of the present paper.
Since we need to introduce in more detail the tools
used in this work, we do this in Section II and postpone
the outline of the paper to paragraph IID.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE NO-SIGNALLING
POLYTOPE
This first section introduces the language and the tools
which are needed in a general framework. We focus from
the very beginning onto bipartite correlations, i.e. corre-
lations involving two partners, traditionally called Alice
and Bob.
A. Formalization of Bell-type experiments
The physical situation one must keep in mind is a Bell-
type experiment. Alice and Bob receive several pairs of
entangled quantum particles. On each particle, Alice per-
forms the measurement x randomly drawn from a finite
set of mA possibilities; as a result, she obtains the out-
put a out of a discrete set containing nA symbols. Inde-
pendently from Alice, Bob performs the measurement y
randomly drawn from a finite set of mB possibilities; as
a result, he obtains the output b out of a discrete set con-
taining nB symbols. Such an experiment is characterized
by the family of probabilities
P (a, b, x, y) = P (a, b|x, y)P (x)P (y) . (1)
There are D = mAmB nA nB such numbers, so each ex-
periment can be described by a point in a D-dimensional
space; more precisely, in a region of such a space,
bounded by the conditions that probabilities must be
positive and sum up to one. By imposing further restric-
tions on the possible probability distributions, the region
of possible experiment shrinks, thus adding non-trivial
boundaries [8–10]. For our study, three restrictions are
meaningful.
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The first restriction is the requirement that the prob-
ability distribution must be built without communica-
tion, only with shared randomness. In the literature,
this has been known as the hypothesis of local hidden
variables. In our context, these variables are not hidden
”in nature” (as in the original interpretational debates
about quantum physics): they may rather be hidden in
Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories, in the devices that Eve
has provided to them. The bounded region, which con-
tains all probability distributions that can be obtained
by shared randomness, forms a polytope, that is a convex
set bounded by a finite number of hyperplanes (”facets”);
therefore we refer to it as to the local polytope. The ver-
tices of the local polytope are the points corresponding
to deterministic strategies, that is, strategies in which
a = a(x) and b = b(y) with probability one; that is,
P (a, b|x, y) = δa,a(x)δb,b(y). There are clearly mnAA mnBB
such strategies. The vertices are thus easily listed, but
to find the facets given the vertices is a computationally
hard task. The importance of finding the facets is pretty
clear. If a point, representing an experiment, lies within
the polytope, then there exists a strategy with shared
randomness (a local variable model) that produces the
same probability distribution. If on the contrary a point
lies outside the local polytope, then the experiment can-
not be reproduced with shared randomness only. The
interpretation of the facets of the local polytope is there-
fore obvious: they correspond to Bell’s inequalities. We
shall call non-local region the region which lies outside
the local polytope.
The second restriction is the requirement that the
probability distribution must be obtained from measure-
ments on quantum bipartite systems. The bounded re-
gion thus obtained shall be called the quantum region.
It is not a polytope, since there is not a finite set of ex-
tremal points. It is a convex set if one really allows all
possible measurements on all possible states in arbitrary-
dimensional Hilbert space [9,11]; if one restricts to the
measurements on a given state, or even to von-Neumann
measurements on a Hilbert space with given dimension,
convexity is not proved in general (although no counter-
example is known, to our knowledge). Needless to recall,
the quantum region contains the local polytope, but is
larger than it: measurement on quantum states can give
rise to non-local correlations (Bell inequalities are vio-
lated).
The third restriction is the requirement that the prob-
ability distribution must not allow signalling from Alice
to Bob or viceversa. The no-signalling requirement is ful-
filled if and only if Alice’s marginal distribution does not
depend on Bob’s choice of input, and viceversa: that is,
the probability distributions must fulfill
∑
b
P (a, b|x, y) = P (a|x) , (2)
∑
a
P (a, b|x, y) = P (b|y) . (3)
These conditions define again a polytope, the no-
signalling polytope, which contains the quantum region.
The deterministic strategies are still vertices for this poly-
tope; to these, one must add other vertices which rep-
resent, loosely speaking, purely non-local no-signalling
strategies. These additional points, sometimes called
non-local machines or non-local boxes, have been fully
characterized only in a few cases.
B. Secrecy of probability distributions
Here is the question that we are going to address in
this paper. Alice and Bob have repeated many times
the ”measurement” procedure and share an arbitrary
large number of realizations of the random variables dis-
tributed according to P (a, b|x, y). By revealing a fraction
of their lists, they can estimate whether their probability
distribution lies in the local polytope or in the non-local
region. The goal is to study whether Alice and Bob can
extract secrecy out of their data with this knowledge only.
To motivate the question, let us consider the best-
known quantum cryptography protocol, the one invented
by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) [12]. In this
protocol, a, b ∈ {0, 1} and x, y ∈ {X,Z} are both bi-
nary. In the absence of any error, the BB84 proto-
col distributes perfect correlations when x = y and
no correlations when x 6= y, that is: P (0, 0|X,X) =
P (1, 1|X,X) = 12 , P (0, 0|Z,Z) = P (1, 1|Z,Z) = 12 ,
and P (a, b|X,Z) = p(a, b|Z,X) = 14 . If Alice and Bob
have obtained their results by measuring two-dimensional
quantum systems (qubits), such correlations provide se-
crecy under the usual assumption that the eavesdropper
is limited only by the laws of quantum physics [13]. How-
ever, this distribution can also be obtained with shared
randomness: if Alice and Bob would share randomly dis-
tributed pairs of classical bits (rX , rZ), they simply have
to output rZ (respectively rX) if they are asked to mea-
sure Z (respectively X). Thus we see the importance
of the additional assumption on the physical realization,
namely, that both Alice and Bob are measuring a qubit,
and therefore the pair (rX , rZ) is not available because
[X,Z] 6= 0.
In other words, the correlations of BB84, even in the
absence of errors, are not secure ”by themselves”: they
are secure only provided the quantum degrees of freedom
are under good control. The question we raised can now
be put in its true perspective: are there correlations that
are secure by themselves, by the very fact of being what
they are, without having even to describe how Alice and
Bob managed to obtain them from a real channel?
It turns out that it is easier to tackle this question by
considering that the eavesdropper Eve is not even limited
by quantum physics, but only by the no-signalling con-
straint. This means that Eve can distribute any many-
instances probability distribution P (~a,~b|~x, ~y) that lies
within the no-signalling polytope; Alice and Bob have
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the freedom of choosing their sequence of measurements
(~x and ~y respectively) and will obtain the corresponding
outcomes. By making this assumption, we stand clearly
on the conservative side: if we can demonstrate that a
non-vanishing secret key can be extracted against such
a powerful eavesdropper, then the secret key achievable
against a ”realistic” (i.e., quantum) eavesdropper will be
at least as long.
In quantum cryptography, secrecy relies on entangle-
ment. On which physical quantity can such a strong
security, as the one we are asking for, rely? The answer
is: on the non-locality of the correlations, that is, on the
fact that the correlations cannot be obtained by shared
randomness [5]. No secrecy can be extracted if Alice and
Bob share a probability distribution which lies within the
local polytope, just as no secrecy against a quantum Eve
can be extracted out of separable states [14,15].
C. Individual eavesdropping strategies
Barrett, Hardy and Kent [3] have shown an example of
a protocol, in which quantum correlations can provide se-
crecy against the most powerful attack by a no-signalling
Eve. This is the first example that one can achieve se-
curity even against a supra-quantum Eve, showing that
security in key distribution arises from general features
of no-signalling distributions rather than from the speci-
ficities of the Hilbert space structure. However, their ex-
ample has important limitations: actually, it provides a
protocol to distribute a single secret bit (thence zero key
rate) in the case when Alice and Bob share correlations
that can be ascribed to noiseless quantum states.
In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other
side: we don’t go straight for security against the most
powerful adversary, but we follow the same path that was
followed historically by quantum cryptography, namely,
we limit the eavesdropper to adopt an individual strategy.
This means the following: Eve follows the same proce-
dure for each instance of measurement — that is, she
is not allowed to correlate different instances. Moreover,
Eve is asked to put her input z before any error correction
and privacy amplification. Consequently, any individual
attack is described of a three-partite probability distri-
bution P (a, b, e|x, y, z) such that
P (a, b|x, y) =
∑
e
P (e|z)P (a, b|x, y, e, z) . (4)
Note that Eve is also limited by no-signalling, that is
why the left hand side does not depend on z. One can
see that this is an individual attack by looking at it as
follows: when Eve gets outcome e out of her input z, she
sends out the point P (a, b|x, y, e, z).
Now we demonstrate two similar, important results
about individual eavesdropping strategies:
Theorem 1: Eve can limit herself in sending out ex-
tremal points of the no-signalling polytope.
Proof. Suppose that an attack is defined, in which one
of the P (a, b|x, y, e, z) is not an extremal point. Then,
this point can be itself decomposed on extremal points:
P (a, b|x, y, e, z) = ∑λ P (λ)P (a, b|x, y, e, z, λ) where the
P (a, b|x, y, e, z, λ) are all extremal. But the knowledge of
λ must be given to Eve: by redefining Eve’s symbol as
(e, λ)→ e, we have an attack which is as powerful as the
one we started from, and is of the form (4) while having
only extreme points in the decomposition.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Alice and Bob can trans-
form P (a, b|x, y) into P˜ (a, b|x, y) by using only local
operations and public communication independent of
a, b, x, y. Then there exist a purification of P˜ (a, b|x, y)
that gives Eve as much information as the best purifica-
tion of P (a, b|x, y).
Proof. Suppose (4) is the best purification of P from
Eve’s point of view; for clarity, let’s use Theorem 1 to say
that the P (a, b|x, y, e, z) are extremal points. The pro-
cedure of Alice and Bob can be described as follows: for
each realization of the variables (a, b, x, y), Alice draws a
random number and reveals publicly its value j; then, she
and Bob apply the local transformation Tj on which they
have previously agreed, transforming x → Xj, a → Aj
etc. Since there is no correlation between j and (e, z),
each extremal point Pǫ(a, b|x, y, e, z) is transformed into
P˜ (a, b|x, y, e, z) =
∑
j
P (j)P (Aj , Bj |Xj , Yj , e, z)
=
∑
j,ǫ
P (j)P (ǫ|e, j)P (a, b|x, y, ǫ, z) . (5)
Consequently, P˜ (a, b|x, y) is a mixture of the ex-
tremal points P (a, b|x, y, ǫ, z) with weight P (ǫ|z) =∑
j,e P (e|z)P (j)P (ǫ|e, j). To conclude the proof, just no-
tice that Eve has been able to follow the full procedure,
because she has learnt j and the list of the Tj is publicly
known. Thus, there exist a decomposition of P˜ (a, b|x, y)
onto extremal points that gives Eve as much information
as the best decomposition of P (a, b|x, y).
D. Outline of the paper
This is all that could be said in full generality. In what
follows, we study mainly scenarios in which x, y ∈ {0, 1}:
Alice and Bob choose between two possible measure-
ments. In Section III, we address the case where also
the outcomes a and b are both binary; apart from para-
graph III D, all the results of this Section have been an-
nounced in Ref. [4]. In Section IV, we explore the case
where both the outcomes are d-valued, in particular for
d = 3. In both situations, we shall consider an explicit
protocol for Alice and Bob, without claim of optimality.
Conclusions and perspectives are listed in Section V.
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III. BINARY OUTCOMES
In this Section, we considermA = mB = nA = nB = 2;
that is, a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} are all binary. Below, all the
sums involving bits are to be computed modulo 2.
A. The polytopes and the quantum region
In the case of binary inputs and outputs, the local
and the no-signalling polytopes have been fully charac-
terized, and their structure is rather simple. A lot (but
not all) is known about the quantum region too. Under
no-signalling, the full probability distribution is entirely
characterized by eight probabilities, therefore all these
objects live in an 8-dimensional space.
The local polytope [16,17] has eight non-trivial facets.
Up to symmetries like relabelling of the inputs and of
the outputs, they are all equivalent to the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [18]. The representa-
tive of this inequality reads
CHSH =
1∑
x,y=0
P (a+ b = xy|xy) ≤ 3 . (6)
On each facet lie eight out of the sixteen deterministic
strategies; these are said to saturate the inequality, be-
cause by definition they give CHSH = 3. Note that the
eight points on a facet are linearly independent from one
another [19]. The deterministic strategies that saturate
our representative (6) are readily seen to be the following
ones:
Lr1 = {a(x) = r, b(y) = r}
Lr2 = {a(x) = x+ r, b(y) = r}
Lr3 = {a(x) = r, b(y) = y + r}
Lr4 = {a(x) = x+ r, b(y) = y + r + 1}
(7)
where r = 0, 1.
The no-signalling polytope [10] is obtained from the lo-
cal polytope by adding a single extremal non-local point
on top of each CHSH facet. The non-local point on top
of our representative is defined by
PR =
1
2
δ(a+ b = xy) . (8)
This point is the so-called PR-box, invented by Popescu
and Rohrlich [20] and by Tsirelson [8]. It violates the
CHSH inequality up to its algebraic limit CHSH = 4.
About the quantum region: the set of correlations that
are producible by measuring quantum states is known,
and corresponds to what can be produced by measure-
ment on two-qubit states [21]. It is an open question,
whether the analysis of the marginals can reveal further
features of the quantum region. The violation of CHSH
is bounded by
CHSH(QM) ≤ 2 +
√
2 , (9)
where the maximum is reached with the probability dis-
tribution
P (a+ b = xy|xy) =
1 + 1√
2
2
(10)
obtained by measuring suitable observables on a maxi-
mally entangled state.
B. The non-local raw probability distribution
To study the possibility of secret key extraction, we
can restrict our attention to the sector of the non-local
region that lies above a given facet of the local polytope,
say the representative one for which we have collected
the tools above. Any point in this sector, by definition,
can be decomposed as a convex combination of the PR-
box (8) and of the eight deterministic strategies on the
facet (7). As shown above, we can assume without loss of
generality that Eve distributes these nine strategies. We
shall write pNL (for ”non-local”) the probability that Eve
sends the PR-box to Alice and Bob; and prj the proba-
bility that Eve sends the deterministic strategy Lrj . We
shall also write pL =
∑
j,r p
r
j = 1− pNL.
The statistics generated by Eve sending the extremal
points are summarized in the Table I. The reading of
this Table is pretty clear. For instance, one finds that
P (a = b = 0|x = y = 0) = pNL/2 + p01 + p02 + p03. To ob-
tain the P (a, b, x, y), one must multiply the entries of the
Table by P (x)P (y). Since we are supposing that the ex-
tremal points are sent to Alice and Bob by Eve, the label
of each point can be considered also as Eve’s symbol.
Finally, we note that using Table I in (6), one finds
pNL = CHSH − 3 . (11)
In other words, pNL measures directly the violation of the
CHSH inequality. It follows that in the quantum region
pNL(QM) ≤
√
2− 1 ≈ 0.414 . (12)
C. The CHSH protocol for cryptography
Whenever Eve distributes the PR-box, she has no in-
formation at all about the bits received by Alice and Bob,
because of the monogamy of those correlations [10]. On
the contrary, when she distributes a deterministic strat-
egy, she has some information, depending on the actual
cryptographic protocol. The question is thus, which is
the best procedure to extract a secret key out of the raw
distribution of Table I? We have no answer in full gener-
ality; but we can notice a few things and propose a pro-
tocol which is a reasonable candidate for optimality. A
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good cryptography protocol should (i) present high cor-
relations between Alice and Bob, and (ii) reduce Eve’s
information as much as possible. Now, in the raw data,
we see that Alice and Bob are highly anti-correlated when
x = y = 1: it is thus natural to devise a procedure that
allows them to transform these anti-correlations in cor-
relations. A good procedure reveals as small as possible
information on the public channel.
The protocol we propose, and that we call CHSH pro-
tocol for obvious reasons, is the following:
1. Distribution. Alice and Bob repeat the measure-
ment procedure on arbitrarily many instances and
collect their data.
2. Parameter estimation. By revealing publicly some
of their results, they estimate the parameters of
their distribution, in particular the fraction pNL of
intrinsically non-local correlations.
3. Pseudo-Sifting. For each instance, Alice reveals the
measurement she has performed (x = 0 or x = 1).
Whenever Alice declares x = 1 and Bob has cho-
sen y = 1, Bob flips his bit. Bob does not reveal
the measurement he has performed. This is the
procedure which transforms anti-correlations into
correlations while revealing the smallest amount
of information on the public channel. We call it
pseudo-sifting, because it enters in the protocol at
the same place as sifting occurs in other protocols,
but here all the items are kept.
4. Classical processing. The details depend on
whether one considers one-way post-processing
(”error correction and privacy amplification”, ef-
ficient in terms of secret key rate) or two-way post-
processing (”advantage distillation”, inefficient for
small errors but tolerating larger errors). The two
cases are discussed separately below.
After pseudo-sifting, and writing ξj = P (y = j), we
can write the Alice-Bob-Eve distribution splits into two,
one for each value of x, as given in Table II. It is impor-
tant to understand the content of these two distributions.
Suppose Eve has sent out L01 and Alice has announced
x = 0 in the pseudo-sifting phase. Then Eve knows for
sure both Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes, here a = 0 and
b = 0; and in fact, for x = 0, the strategy L01 gives only
this result. However, if Eve has sent out L03 and Alice has
announced x = 0, things are different: Eve still knows for
sure Alice’s outcome (a = 0), but Bob’s outcome depends
on his input, being b = 0 if y = 0, b = 1 if y = 1. Re-
markably, the roles are exactly reversed for x = 1: in this
case, L03 produces only a = 0 and b = 0; while L
0
1 gives
a = 0, b = 0 if y = 0 and b = 1 if y = 1.
In fact, a closer examination of the Tables shows that
all the eight local point have such a behavior: (i) Alice’s
outcome a is always known to Eve, because the setting
used by Alice is publicly known. (ii) If a local point pro-
vides Eve with full information about Bob’s outcome b
when x = 0, the same point leaves her uncertain about b
when x = 1; and viceversa. We shall come back to this
interesting feature in paragraph III D. Obviously, Eve’s
uncertainty is maximal when Alice’s and Bob’s settings
are chosen at random, therefore we set from now on
P (x = i) = P (y = j) ≡ ξj = 1
2
. (13)
Note that this situation is different from quantum cryp-
tography: in the quantum case, Eve’s information does
not depend on the frequency with which each setting is
used, and in fact Alice and Bob can use almost always the
same setting, provided they use the other one(s) some-
times in order to check coherence [22].
Now we can understand better the advantage of our
pseudo-sifting procedure. If neither Alice nor Bob would
reveal their setting, Eve’s information on the determin-
istic strategies would decrease, but Alice and Bob would
stay anti-correlated when x = y = 1. If on the contrary
both Alice and Bob would reveal their setting, Eve would
have full information on both a and b for every determin-
istic strategy. The pseudo-sifting procedure corrects for
the anti-correlation, and keeps some uncertainty in Eve’s
knowledge about Bob’s result.
In summary, Table II contains the probability distri-
bution Alice-Bob-Eve after pseudo-sifting. Now we must
study whether one can extract secrecy out of them, using
classical pre- and post-processing. Before turning our at-
tention to that, we want to stress a nice feature of the
distribution we have just obtained.
D. Uncertainty relations
Remarkably, the protocol we have defined exhibits a
feature which is also present in quantum cryptography,
namely the fact that Eve gains information on a ”basis”
at the expense of introducing errors in the complemen-
tary one. Here it is precisely.
Refer to Table II, recalling that ξ0 = ξ =
1
2 . The prob-
abilities p(a 6= b|x) of error between Alice and Bob when
x = 0 and x = 1 are respectively
eAB|0 =
1
2
(
p03 + p
1
3 + p
0
4 + p
1
4
)
, (14)
eAB|1 =
1
2
(
p01 + p
1
1 + p
0
2 + p
1
2
)
. (15)
Eve’s uncertainty on Bob’s symbol, measured by condi-
tional Shannon entropy, is
H(B|E, x = 0) = 1− (p01 + p11 + p02 + p12) (16)
H(B|E, x = 1) = 1− (p03 + p13 + p04 + p14) . (17)
Thus, there appear in our protocol a cryptographic un-
certainty relation in the form
H(B|E, x) = 1− 2eAB|x+1 . (18)
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The origin of this relation is rather clear. The pseudo-
sifting phase of the protocol is optimized to extract cor-
relations from the non-local strategy (PR-box), but on
deterministic strategies, the pseudo-sifting has another
action. Specifically: for Lr1 and L
r
2, after pseudo-sifting
we have b(y = 0) = b(y = 1) = a when x = 0 (no error,
and Eve knows b), and b(y = 0) 6= b(y = 1) when x = 1
(error in half cases, and Eve does not know b); for Lr3
and Lr4, it’s just the opposite. In summary, for each local
strategy, Eve learns everything only for one Alice’s set-
ting, and for the other an error between Alice and Bob
occurs half of the times.
This is the first evidence of an analogue of quan-
tum mechanical uncertainty relations in a generic no-
signalling theory. We can now move to the main issue,
the extraction of a secret key.
E. One-way classical post-processing
1. Generalities
For one-way classical post-processing, the bound for
the length of the achievable secret key rate under the
assumption of individual attacks is the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
(CK) bound [23,24]. In the case where Eve’s knows more
about Alice’s symbol than about Bob’s, as is the case
here, the CK bound reads
RCK = sup
(B′,T )←B
[
H(B′|E, T )−H(B′|A, T )] (19)
where B → (B′, T ) is called pre-processing: from his ini-
tial data B, Bob obtains some processed data B′ that he
does not reveal, and some other processed data T that
are broadcasted on a public channel. For classical distri-
butions, bitwise pre-processing is already optimal [23,24].
In this paper, we have not explored the possible use of T :
in this case, the pre-processing reduces to flipping each
bit with some probability q. Consequently, we’ll have an
estimate rCK ≤ RCK for the achievable secret key rate.
Recalling the link I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ) between
Shannon entropies and mutual information, we write our
estimate for the CK bound as
rCK = max
B′←B
[
I(A : B′)− I(B′ : E)]
=
1
2
∑
x=0,1
max
B′←B
[
I(A : B′|x) − I(B′ : E|x)] . (20)
Let’s sketch the computation explicitly for x = 0 (for
conciseness, we omit to write this condition in the for-
mulae below). In Table II, one reads for p(a, b):
p(0, 0) = pNL2 + p
0
1 + p
0
2 +
p03+p
0
4
2
p(0, 1) =
p03+p
0
4
2
p(1, 0) =
p13+p
1
4
2
p(1, 1) = pNL2 + p
1
1 + p
1
2 +
p13+p
1
4
2
. (21)
If we denote by q the probability that Bob flips his bit in
the pre-processing, then
p(a, b′) = (1− q)p(a, b = b′) + qp(a, b = b′ + 1) . (22)
These four probabilities allow to compute the mutual in-
formation I(A : B′) = H(A)−H(A|B′). Turning to Eve:
before pre-processing, she has full knowledge on Bob’s
symbol for Lr1 and L
r
2, and no knowledge for L
r
3 and L
r
4.
As a consequence of the fact that Eve knows exactly on
which items she has full information and on which she
has no information at all, one has simply
H(B′|E) = H(B|E) + [1−H(B|E)]h(q) (23)
where h is binary entropy. The calculation is of course
identical for x = 1 and this allows to compute rCK for
any probability distribution. We focus explicitly on two
cases.
2. Isotropic distribution
Let’s consider an isotropic probability distribution,
that is, a distribution of the form
P (a, b|x, y) = 1 + pNL
4
δ(a+ b = xy) +
pL
8
. (24)
This necessarily implies prj = pL/8 for all j, r, since recall
that the Lrj are linearly independent. Note that the point
of highest violation in the quantum region (10) is of this
form, with pNL =
√
2− 1.
Remarkably, Alice and Bob can transform any distri-
bution with a given pNL to the isotropic distribution de-
fined by the same pNL with local operations and pub-
lic communication, a procedure called ”depolarization”
[25]. This implies that the results of this paragraph are
in some sense generic. In fact, by Theorem 2 of para-
graph II C, Eve’s best individual eavesdropping strategy
for a fixed value of pNL consists in preparing an isotropic
distribution. Alternatively, we can modify the protocol
to add the fact that Alice and Bob apply systematically
the depolarization procedure.
For isotropic distributions, the two tables for x = 0
and x = 1 become identical, and we can rewrite them
as Table III. In this Table, we have changed the nota-
tion for Eve’s knowledge, and have written (a, b) when
Eve knows both outcomes, (a, ?) when she knows only
Alice’s, and (?, ?) when she knows none.
This distribution has p(a = 0) = p(a = 1) = 12 . Be-
fore pre-processing, the error between Alice and Bob is
eAB = pL/4; after pre-processing, the quantity to be cor-
rected in error correction is e′AB = (1−q)eAB+q(1−eAB).
Eve’s information is pL2 [1− h(q)]. Thus
rCK = max
q∈[0, 1
2
]
[
1− h(e′AB)−
pL
2
[1− h(q)]
]
. (25)
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This quantity is plotted in Fig. 2 as a function of the dis-
turbance D defined by pNL =
√
2(1 − 2D) − 1. This
parameter characterizes the properties of the channel
linking Alice and Bob: it is therefore useful for com-
parison with a quantum realization of the CHSH proto-
col and with BB84, see IIIG and Appendix A. We see
that rCK > 0 for D <∼ 6.3% that is pNL >∼ 0.236 for
the optimal pre-processing. Without pre-processing, the
bound becomes pNL >∼ 0.318. The important remark
is that both these values are within the quantum region
(12). This means that using quantum physics, one can
distribute correlations which allow (at least against in-
dividual attacks) the extraction of a secret key without
any further assumption about the details of the physical
realization.
3. Reaching the Bell limit
Another interesting example deals with the following
question: can one find one-parameter families of prob-
ability distributions for which RCK > 0 as soon as
pNL > 0; that is, distributions for which one can ex-
tract a secret key out of one-way processing, down to the
limit of the local polytope? The answer is yes, and this
can be achieved even without pre-processing. Here is an
example: set p01 = p
0
2, p
1
1 = p
1
2, and p
r
3,4 = 0. For both
x = 0 and x = 1 we have p(a = 0) = p(a = 1) = 12 . For
x = 0, Alice and Bob make no errors (eAB|0 = 0), and
Eve’s information is I(B : E|x = 0) = pL; for x = 1, the
errors of Alice and Bob are eAB|1 =
pL
2 and Eve has no in-
formation. In summary, even neglecting pre-processing,
rCK = 1− 1
2
h(pL/2)− pL
2
(26)
which is strictly positive in the whole region pL < 1.
Note that the distributions described here cannot be
broadcasted using quantum states. The reason is that the
quantum intersection with the non-local region is strictly
inside this region, where ”inside” means that, as soon as
pNL > 0, all the p
r
j must be non zero, because the L
r
j are
linearly independent. On the contrary, here we have set
pr3,4 = 0. Anyway, in spite of the fact that we are not
able to broadcast this distribution with known physical
means, it is interesting to notice that there exists a fam-
ily of probability distributions that can lead to a secret
key under one-way post-processing, for any amount of
non-locality.
F. Two-way classical post-processing
1. Advantage distillation (AD)
Contrary to the one-way case, no tight bound like the
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner bound is known when two-way classical
post-processing is allowed; nor is the optimal procedure
known. The best-known two-way post-processing is the
so-called advantage distillation (AD). Forgetting about
pre-processing, one can see the effect of AD as follows:
starting from a situation where I(A : B) < I(B : E), one
makes a processing at the end of which the new variables
satisfy I(A˜ : B˜) > I(B˜ : E˜); at this point, one applies
the one-way post-processing.
In AD, Alice reveals N instances such that her N bits
are equal: ai1 = ... = aiN = α. Bob looks at the same
instances, and announces whether his bits are also all
equal. If indeed bi1 = ... = biN = β, which happens with
probability (1 − eAB)N + eNAB, Alice and Bob keep one
instance; otherwise, they discard all the N bits. Bob’s
error on Alice’s symbols becomes
e˜AB =
eNAB
(1 − eAB)N + eNAB
≈
(
eAB
1− eAB
)N
. (27)
Notice that e˜AB → 0 in the limit N → ∞: this means
that α = β almost always, for N sufficiently large. This
remark is used to estimate Eve’s probability of error (see
below for concrete applications). Typically, one finds
that Eve’s error on Bob’s symbols goes as
e˜E >∼ C (f(eAB))N (28)
with f(.) some function which depends on the probability
distribution under study. Now, as long as the condition
f(eAB) >
eAB
1− eAB (29)
is fulfilled, Eve’s error at the end of AD is exponentially
larger than Bob’s for increasing N : there exists always
a finite value of N such that Eve’s error becomes larger
than Bob’s. The bound on the tolerable error after AD
is then computed by solving eq. 29.
We apply this procedure to the isotropic correlations
described above (III E 2), first without pre-processing,
then by allowing Alice and Bob to perform some bit flip
before starting AD. We anticipate the result: we find
that a key can be extracted for pNL >∼ 0.09; that is, even
with two way post-processing we are not able to reach the
Bell limit for isotropic correlations. It is an open ques-
tion, whether the Bell limit can be reached by a better
two-way post-processing for the isotropic distribution.
2. AD without pre-processing
We refer to Table III. We have, as above, eAB =
pL
4 .
We must now estimate Eve’s error on Bob’s symbol after
AD. Eve knows α as soon as she knows one of Alice’s sym-
bols aik , and recall that asymptotically the guess β = α
is correct. The only situation in which Eve is obliged to
make a random guess is therefore the case in which all
the N instances correspond to Eve’s symbol (?, ?). The
probability that Eve’s guess of Bob’s symbol is wrong is
therefore
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e˜E >∼
1
2
(
pNL
1− eAB
)N
(30)
where the denominator comes from the fact that we must
condition on the bit’s acceptance. Using (29), we obtain
that secrecy can be extracted as long as pNL > pL/4 that
pNL > 1/5. This is lower than the bound obtained for
one-way post-processing, as expected.
3. AD with pre-processing
The previous bound can be further improved by allow-
ing Alice and Bob to pre-process their lists before start-
ing AD. For two-way post-processing, it is not known
whether bitwise pre-processing is already optimal; but
we restrict to it in this work. Specifically, we suppose
that Alice flips her bit with probability qA, Bob with
probability qB. By inspection, one finds that the proba-
bility distribution obtained from Table III after this pre-
processing is the one of Table IV, where we have written
q¯ = 1 − q. Just by looking at the Table, one can guess
the interest of pre-processing: the five possible symbols
for Eve are now spread in all the four cells of the table.
For instance, Eve’s symbol is (0, 0) was present only in
the case a = b = 0 in Table III, that is, whenever she had
this symbol Eve had full information; this is no longer the
case in Table IV. Note also that the roles of qA and qB
are not symmetric, because only qA mixes the strategies
for which Eve does not know Bob’s symbol.
The distribution of Table IV is such that
e′AB =
(
pNL +
pL
2
)
(qAq¯B + q¯AqB) +
pL
4
. (31)
The estimate of Eve’s error requires some attention. As
before, we assume that as soon as Eve guesses correctly
Alice’s symbol α, she automatically guesses also β; so the
question is, when is Eve uncertain about α, in the asymp-
totic regime of large N? Of course, inequality (30) still
holds with e′AB replacing eAB; but this condition is too
weak here: it does not make any use of the uncertainty
introduced on Eve’s knowledge by the pre-processing.
Eve’s situation now is such that, even if she has a sym-
bol (a, b) or (a, ?), she cannot be completely sure whether
α = a or not. Suppose that among her N symbols, Eve
has n0 times the symbol (?, ?), n
0
1 times the symbol (0, ?),
n11 times the symbol (1, ?), n
0
2 times the symbol (0, 0), and
n12 times the symbol (1, 1). Eve cannot avoid errors when
p(a = 0|e) = p(a = 1|e), that is when n01 = n11 ≡ n1 and
n02 = n
1
2 ≡ n2. We have therefore the bound
e˜′E >∼
1
2
∑
n0,n1,n2
N !
n0!(n1!)2(n2!)2
γn0(?,?) γ
2n1
1 γ
2n2
2 (32)
where the sum is taken under the constraint n0 + 2n1 +
2n2 = N , γe is the probability that Eve has symbol e con-
ditioned on the bit’s acceptance, and γ1 ≡ √γ(0,?)γ(1,?),
γ2 ≡ √γ(0,0)γ(1,1). By using (n!)2 ∼ (2n)!/22n and sum-
ming the multinomial expansion, we obtain
e˜′E >∼
1
8
(
γ(?,?) + 2γ1 + 2γ2
)N
. (33)
Now we must find the expressions for the γe in Table
IV. Suppose for definiteness that Alice and Bob have
accepted the bit α = β = 0: this happens with prob-
ability
1−e′AB
2 . The probability that this happens and
that Eve has got the symbol (?, ?) is pNL2 (q¯Aq¯B + qAqB);
whence γ(?,?) =
pNL(q¯A q¯B+qAqB)
1−e′
AB
. Similarly, the probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob accept the bit 0 and that Eve has
got (0, ?), respectively (1, ?), is pL8 q¯A, respectively
pL
8 qA;
whence γ1 =
pL
√
q¯AqA
4 (1−e′
AB
) . In a similar way, one computes
γ2. By writing δe ≡ (1− e′AB)γe, we have then
δ(?,?) = pNL (q¯Aq¯B + qAqB) ,
δ1 =
pL
4
√
q¯AqA ,
δ2 =
pL
2
√
q¯AqA
√
q¯BqB
(34)
and the condition for extraction of a secret key becomes
δ(?,?) + 2δ1 + 2δ2 > e
′
AB . (35)
The optimization over qA and qB can be done numeri-
cally. The result is that a secret key can be extracted at
least down to pNL ≈ 0.09.
4. Positivity of intrinsic information
Given a tripartite probability distribution, P (a, b, e),
an upper bound to the secret-key rate R is given by the
so-called intrinsic information I(A : B ↓ E), denoted
more briefly in what follows by I↓. This function, intro-
duced in [26], reads
I(A : B ↓ E) = min
E→E¯
I(A : B|E¯), (36)
the minimization running over all the channels E → E¯.
Here, I(A : B|E) denotes the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob conditioned on Eve. That is, for
each value of Eve’s variable e, the correlations between
Alice and Bob are described by the conditioned prob-
ability distribution P (a, b|e). The conditioned mutual
information I(A : B|E) is equal to the mutual informa-
tion of these probability distribution averaged over P (e).
The exact computation of the intrinsic information is in
general difficult. However, a huge simplification was ob-
tained in [27], where it was shown that the minimization
in Eq. (36) can be restricted to variables E¯ of the same
size as the original one, E. This allows a numerical ap-
proach to this problem.
The intrinsic information can be understood as a wit-
ness of secret correlations in P (a, b, e). Indeed, a proba-
bility distribution can be established by local operations
and public communication if, and only if, its intrinsic
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information is zero [28]. It is then clear why the positiv-
ity of the intrinsic information is a necessary condition
for positive secret-key rate. Whether it is sufficient is at
present unknown: strong support has been given to the
existence of probability distributions such that R = 0
and I↓ > 0. These would constitute examples of prob-
ability distributions containing bound information [29],
that is non-distillable secret correlations. The existence
of bound information has been proven in a multipartite
scenario consisting ofN > 2 honest parties and the eaves-
dropper [30]. However, it remains as an open problem for
the more standard bipartite scenario.
Using these tools, it is possible to study the secrecy
properties of the probability distribution P (a, b, e) de-
rived from the previous CHSH-protocol. A first com-
putation of its conditioned mutual information gives
I(A : B|E) = pNL. This result easily follows from Table
II: when e = (?, ?), that happens with probability pNL,
Alice and Bob are perfectly correlated, so their mutual
information is equal to one. In all the remaining cases,
e.g. e = (0, 0), Alice and Bob have no correlations. Using
this observation, one can guess the optimal map E → E¯.
In order to minimize the conditioned mutual information,
this map should deteriorate the perfect correlations be-
tween Alice and Bob when e = (?, ?). A way of doing
this is by mapping (0, ?) and (1, ?) into (?, ?), leaving the
other symbols unchanged [31]. We conjecture that this
defines the optimal map for the computation of the in-
trinsic information. Actually, all our numerical evidence
supports this conjecture. Thus, the conjectured value for
the intrinsic information is
I↓ =
(
1− pL
2
)(
1− h
(
pL
4− 2pL
))
. (37)
Interestingly, this quantity is positive whenever pNL > 0.
If the conjecture is true, it implies that either (i) it is
possible to have a positive secret-key rate for the whole
region of Bell violation, using a new key-distillation pro-
tocol, or (ii) the probability distribution of Table II rep-
resents an example of bipartite bound information for
sufficiently small values of pNL.
G. Quantum cryptographic analysis of the CHSH
protocol
It is interesting to analyze the CHSH protocol with
the standard approach of quantum cryptography: Alice
and Bob share a quantum state of two qubits and have
agreed on the physical measurements corresponding to
each value of x and y; Eve is constrained to distribute
quantum states, of which she keeps a purification. Re-
cent advances have provided a systematic recipe to find
a lower bound on the secret key rate, that is, to discuss
security when Eve is allowed to perform the most general
strategy compatible with quantum physics (such bounds
have been called ”unconditional security proofs”, but it
should be clear by all that precedes that this wording is
unfortunate).
The resulting bound on the achievable secret key rate
is plotted in Fig. 2. Since the formalism used to compute
this bound is entirely different from the tools used in the
present study, we give this calculation in Appendix A.
It turns out that the CHSH protocol is equivalent to the
BB84 protocol plus some classical pre-processing. In par-
ticular, the robustness to noise is the same for both pro-
tocols. For low error rate, BB84 provides higher secret-
key rate; however, BB84 cannot be used for a device-
independent proof, since (as we noticed above) its corre-
lations become intrinsically insecure if the dimensionality
of the Hilbert space is not known.
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FIG. 2. Achievable secret key rate for the CHSH protocol,
after one-way post-processing: against a no-signalling Eve for
individual attacks, isotropic distribution (III E 2) and against
a quantum Eve, in a two-qubit implementation (IIIG).
IV. LARGER-DIMENSIONAL OUTCOMES
In this Section, we explore the generalization of the
previous results to the case of binary inputs and d-nary
outputs: mA = mB = 2, nA = nB = d; that is,
x, y ∈ {0, 1} and a, b ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1}. Below, all the
sums involving dits are to be computed modulo d.
For this study, it is useful to introduce a notation for
probability distributions and inequalities [32]. While the
full probability space is 4d2-dimensional, one can verify
that only 4d(d−1) parameters are needed to characterize
completely a no-signalling probability distribution — in
other words, D = 4d(d− 1) is the dimension of the space
in which the no-signalling and the local polytopes are em-
bedded. We choose the {P (a|x), a = 0, 1, ..., d− 2; x =
0, 1} (d−1 numbers for each value of x), the {P (b|y), b =
0, 1, ..., d− 2; y = 0, 1} (d − 1 numbers for each value of
y), and the {P (a, b|x, y), a, b = 0, 1, ..., d− 2; x, y = 0, 1}
((d−1)2 numbers for each value of x, y). This we arrange
in arrays as follows:
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P =
A \B P (b|0) P (b|1)
P (a|0) P (a, b|0, 0) P (a, b|0, 1)
P (a|1) P (a, b|1, 0) P (a, b|1, 1)
(38)
Note that this array has 2(d − 1) lines and as many
columns: information on the values a, b = d− 1 is redun-
dant for all inputs because of no-signalling. Of course,
there is no problem in working with the ”full” array with
2d× 2d if one finds it more convenient, provided the ad-
ditional entries are filled consistently because these pa-
rameters are not free.
This notation will also be used for inequalities: in this
case, the numbers in the arrays are the coefficients which
multiply each probability in the expression of the inequal-
ity. Examples will be provided below.
A. Polytopes and the quantum region
1. Known characterization
As one might expect, the characterization of the local
and the no-signalling polytopes are an increasingly hard
task, as the dimension of the output increases.
Numerical studies [17] have provided an unexpectedly
simple structure for the local polytope for small d: as it
happened for d = 2, all the non-trivial facets appear to be
equivalent to the Collins-Gisin-Linden-Massar-Popescu
(CGLMP) inequality [33,34,17,35]
Id =
A \B −1 −1 . . . −1 0 0 . . . 0
−1 1 1 . . . 1 1 0 . . . 0
−1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
−1 0 0 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1
0 1 0 . . . 0 −1 0 . . . 0
0 1 1 . . . 0 −1 −1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 1 1 . . . 1 −1 −1 . . . −1
≤ 0 . (39)
It is conjectured that all non-trivial facets are equivalent
to the CGLMP inequality for all d. Anyway, our work is
independent of the truth of this conjecture: we are go-
ing to study the possibility of secret key extraction for
non-local distributions which lie above a CGLMP facet,
irrespective of whether there exist inequivalent facets or
not.
The no-signalling polytope appears to have a richer
structure than in the case d = 2. All the extremal non-
local points are generalizations of the PR-box [10]. We
are interested in those that lie above our representative
CGLMP facet. The highest violation of CGLMP is pro-
vided by the extremal point
PR2,d =
1
d
δ(b− a = xy) , (40)
whose corresponding array is
PR2,d =
1
d
A \B 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1
1 1 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 1
1 1 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 0
1 0 1 . . . 0 0 0
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 1
1 0 0 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0
. (41)
Its violation of the inequality can be rapidly calculated by
a term-by-term multiplication (a formal scalar product)
of the two arrays (39) and (41), yielding
〈Id, PR2,d〉 = d− 1
d
. (42)
However, PR2,d is not the only non-local extremal point
which lies above a CGLMP facet: in fact, for all d′ < d,
there is at least one PR2,d′ above the facet. For in-
stance, a possible version of PR2,2 ≡ PR reads (boldface
0 standing for matrices filled with zeros)
PR =
1
2
A \B 1 1 0 1 1 0
1
1
1 0
0 1
0
1 0
0 1
0
0 0 0 0 0
1
1
1 0
0 1
0
0 1
1 0
0
0 0 0 0 0
, (43)
whence a violation 〈Id, PR〉 = 12 . For d = 3, we shall give
below (IVC) some additional elements on the structure
of the no-signalling polytope.
The boundaries of the quantum region are basically un-
known to date; it is not even clear whether they coincide
with all possible results of measurements on two-qutrits
states.
2. A slice in the non-local region
As we said, a no-signalling probability distribution is
characterized by 4d(d − 1) parameters. However, when
one reviews the results obtained for the CGLMP inequal-
ity in the context of quantum physics (see Appendix B for
all details), one finds that the probability distributions
associated to the optimal settings belong to a very sym-
metric family. Specifically, these distributions are such
that (i) for fixed inputs x and y, P (a, b|x, y) depends
only on ∆ = a− b; and (ii) the probabilities for the dif-
ferent inputs are related as P (∆|0, 0) = P (−∆|0, 1) =
P (−∆|1, 0) = P (∆− 1|1, 1). Compactly:
P (a, b = a−∆|x, y) = 1
d
pf (44)
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with f = (−1)x+y∆ + xy and pf =
∑
a P (a, b = a −
f |0, 0). The corresponding array is
P =
1
d
A \B 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1
1 p0 p−1 . . . p2 p0 p1 . . . p−2
1 p1 p0 . . . p3 p−1 p0 . . . p−3
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
1 p−2 p−3 . . . p0 p2 p3 . . . p0
1 p0 p1 . . . p−2 p1 p0 . . . p3
1 p−1 p0 . . . p−3 p2 p1 . . . p4
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
1 p2 p3 . . . p0 p−1 p−2 . . . p1
. (45)
This family defines a slice in the no-signalling poly-
tope. Note that all the marginals are equal, that is,
P (a|x) = P (b|y) = 1d . Moreover, the d numbers pf de-
fine uniquely and completely a point P in the slice; thus,
given the constraint
∑
f pf = 1, the slice defined by (44)
is (d− 1)-dimensional. A single extremal non-local point
belongs to the slice, namely PR2,d, obtained by setting
p0 = 1 (40); in fact, none of the PRd′ with d
′ < d has
the correct marginals.
As it happened for the isotropic distributions for d = 2,
there exists a depolarization procedure that maps any
probability distribution onto this slice by local operations
and public communication, while keeping the violation
〈Id, P 〉 constant. The procedure is given in Appendix C.
As a consequence, Eve’s optimal individual eavesdrop-
ping, for a fixed value of the violation of the inequality,
consists in distributing a point in the slice.
B. Cryptography
1. The protocol
We suppose from the beginning p(x = i) = p(y = j) =
1
2 . The protocol is the analog of the CHSH protocol de-
scribed in III C above. When Alice announces x = 1 and
Bob has measured y = 1, Bob corrects his dit according
to b → b − 1. In other words, the pseudo-sifting imple-
ments ∆ → ∆ − xy. The Alice-Bob distribution after
pseudo-sifting, averaged on Bob’s settings, becomes in-
dependent of x (as in the case of isotropic distribution
for d = 2):
P (a, a−∆|x) = 1
d
∑
y=0,1
p(−1)x+y∆ =
p∆ + p−∆
2d
. (46)
In a protocol with d-dimensional outcomes, Alice and
Bob can estimate not just one, but several error rates,
one for each value of ∆. We have just found that these
error rates exhibit the symmetry
eAB(∆) = eAB(−∆) = p∆ + p−∆
2
. (47)
As in the case of bits, we think of Eve as sending either
a local or a non-local probability distribution. Let’s dis-
cuss in some detail the points which lie on and above a
CGLMP facet.
2. Eve’s strategy: local points
To understand what follows, we don’t need a full char-
acterization of the deterministic strategies that saturate
the CGLMP inequality. Some facts are however worth
noting; the proof of these statements and some other
features are given in Appendix D.
The first fact is that, for d > 2, the number of de-
terministic points on the CGLMP facet is strictly larger
thanD = 4d(d−1), the dimension of the local and the no-
signalling polytope. This implies that, for some points on
the facet, several decomposition as a convex combination
of extremal points are possible.
The second fact is that no extremal deterministic strat-
egy belongs to the slice (44): to see it, just recall that
the marginals in the slice are completely random. Since
we require the final distribution to belong to the slice,
Eve must manage to send deterministic strategies with
the suitable probabilities. As a consequence of the pre-
vious remark, at least one local point on the slice can be
obtained by several different decompositions on extremal
points: we’ll have to choose the decomposition that op-
timizes Eve’s information.
As a third fact, we elaborate on the same idea that
lead to the uncertainty relations in paragraph IIID. We
know that all deterministic strategies are not equally in-
teresting for Eve, in fact, two kind of local points are of
special interest for her: (i) those for which b(0) = b(1),
because Eve knows Bob’s symbol when Alice announces
x = 0, and which we denote by the set L0; and (ii) those
for which b(0) = b(1)− 1, because Eve knows Bob’s sym-
bol when Alice announces x = 1, and which we denote
by the set L1. In all the other cases, Eve does not learn
Bob’s symbol with certainty. Now, in the complexity of
the list of deterministic points on the CGLMP facet, a
remarkable feature appears:
• There are exactly d2 points in L0, namely those for
which a(0) = b(0) = b(1) and a(1) can take any
value. In other words, there are no points on the
CGLMP facet such that b(0) = b(1) but a(0) is dif-
ferent from this value: whenever Eve learns Bob’s
symbol for x = 0, Alice and Bob make no error for
x = 0.
• There are exactly d2 points in L1, namely those for
which a(1) = b(0) = b(1) − 1 and a(0) can take
any value. This has a similar interpretation as the
statement above, in the case x = 1.
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Now, since the error rate Alice-Bob depends only on
P (a, b|x, y), and not on the particular decomposition cho-
sen by Eve to realize this distribution, it is obvious that
Eve’s interest lies in distributing local points that belong
to L ≡ L0 ∪ L1 as often as possible. For d = 3, we
shall prove that she can prepare any point in the slice by
distributing only these kind of local points. Finally, we
want to introduce a further distinction within L, which
appears explicitly in the study of d = 3 but may play a
more general role. We shall call L3 the subset of L, whose
points satisfy three out of the four relations a(0) = b(0),
a(0) = b(1), a(1) = b(0) and a(1) = b(1)− 1; the comple-
mentary set, containing the points that satisfy two of the
relations (a(0) = b(0) = b(1) or a(1) = b(0) = b(1)− 1),
is written L2.
3. Eve’s strategy: non-local point
We have said that, among the extremal non-local
points which lie above the CGLMP facet, the only one on
the slice (44) is PR2,d. However, it may be the case that
mixtures of other extremal non-local points lie as well in
the slice. For d = 3, this is not the case (see Appendix E),
but we have not been able to generalize this statement.
In this study, we suppose tentatively that Eve sends a
unique non-local strategy, namely PR2,d. Under this as-
sumption, we can define pNL as the probability that Eve
sends PR2,d. To find the expression of pNL, we notice
that 〈Id, PR2,d〉 = d−1d should correspond to pNL = 1,
and that 〈Id, L〉 = 0 for all local points on the CGLMP
facet, should correspond to pNL = 0. Moreover, pNL
measures the geometrical distance from the facet and is
therefore an affine function of the violation of CGLMP.
Thus for a generic distribution P of the form (45) we
have
pNL =
d
d− 1 〈Id, P 〉 =
= −2 +
d−1∑
∆=0
(
1− ∆
d− 1
)
[3p−∆ − p∆+1] . (48)
Now we can present the results for the possibility of
extracting a secret key, starting from a detailed study of
the case d = 3 (IVC), then generalizing some results for
arbitrary d (IVD).
C. Secret key extraction: d = 3
1. The slice of the polytope
The slice (44) is 2-dimensional for d = 3, we choose p0
and p1 as free parameters; this gives p2 = 1−p0−p1 and
pNL = 2(p0 − p1)− 1 . (49)
The full slice has a form of an equilateral triangle (Fig. 3),
whose vertices V∆ are defined by p∆ = 1. As mentioned,
V0 = PR2,3. The vertex V2 is also a PR2,3, the one de-
fined by b− a = x¯y¯+ 1 with z¯ = 1− z. On the contrary,
V1 a mixture of deterministic strategies. The middle of
the triangle, p0 = p1 = p2 =
1
3 , is the completely random
strategy (obtained e.g. when measuring the maximally
mixed quantum state, the ”identity”).
2M
3M
230 PRV º
CGLMP
'
C
G
L
M
P
?
? Id
1V
'232 PRV =
FIG. 3. The slice (44) of the no-signalling polytope, for
d = 3. As explained in the text, the full extent of the quan-
tum region is not known, it is represented by the dotted line
with question marks. The full line is the part of the quantum
region we can certainly reach and that we consider in this
paper. See text for all the other details.
We are going to focus on the non-local region close to
V0 (Fig. 4). The intersection with the CGLMP facet is
the segment p0 − p1 = 12 , whose ends are the points la-
belled M2 (p0 =
1
2 , p1 = 0) and M3 (p0 =
3
4 , p1 =
1
4 ).
The decompositions of these mixtures on the extremal
deterministic strategies are
M2 =
∑
L∈L2
1
6
L , M3 =
∑
L∈L3
1
12
L (50)
where the sets of local points L2 and L3 have been defined
above. In fact, the decomposition of M3 is unique; con-
versely,M2 can be decomposed in an infinity of ways (see
Appendix E), but all the others involve also the points
that don’t belong to L and are therefore sub-optimal for
Eve.
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FIG. 4. Zoom of Fig. 3 on the non-local region close to
V0. For clarity, only the part of the quantum region that
we consider is represented here. The transverse lines de-
fine the limits down to which secrecy can be extracted for
one-way post-processing (without and with pre-processing)
and for two-way post-processing without pre-processing. In
the shaded region, the intrinsic information I↓ is zero. We
stress that this figure is an exact plot, not just an ”artist
view”. See text for the other details.
The quantum-mechanical studies (see Appendix B for
more details) have singled out two non-local probability
distributions in this region. The first one corresponds
to the maximal violation of CGLMP using two qutrits,
pNL ≈ 0.4574: it is noted Qmv and is defined by (B6)
with γ =
√
11−√3
2 . The second one corresponds to the
highest violation achievable with the maximally entan-
gled state of two qutrits, pNL ≈ 0.4365: it is noted Qme
and is defined by (B6) with γ = 1.
2. One-way classical post-processing
To write down the table for the correlations Alice-Bob-
Eve, one needs to list explicitly the deterministic points
that saturate CGLMP and the corresponding informa-
tion Eve can extract. This is done in Appendix E. The
result is Table V. It can be verified easily that all the
probabilities in a row/column sum up to 13 ; moreover,
eAB(+1) = eAB(−1) = 1− p0
2
(51)
as expected from (47). We have introduced the sym-
bol ?2 to describe the situation where Eve is uncer-
tain on Bob’s symbol, but only among two possibili-
ties: this is clearly the case whenever the uncertainty
derives from a deterministic strategy. In all that fol-
lows, information is quantified in trits, and we write
h
(
[v1, v2, v3]
)
= −∑j vj log3 vj .
In the absence of pre-processing, Eve has no informa-
tion with probability pNL, full information with proba-
bility pL2 , and information 1−h
(
[1/2, 1/2, 0]
)
= 1− log3 2
with probability pL2 . Therefore the estimate for the CK
bound is
RCK(q = 0) ≥ rCK = 1− h
([
p0,
1− p0
2
,
1− p0
2
])
−pL
(
1− 1
2
log3 2
)
. (52)
The curve rCK(q = 0) = 0 is shown in Fig. 4, it clearly
cuts the quantum region.
A natural question is, which is the point that maxi-
mizes rCK(q = 0) under the requirement that the corre-
lations should belong to the quantum region. In the slice
under consideration, we find a rate rmax(q = 0) ≈ 0.09
trits ≈ 0.144 bits for the correlations defined by p0 =
0.8286, p1 = 0.1093. These correlations can be obtained
by measuring the quantum state
|ψ(γ)〉 = 1√
2 + γ2
(|00〉+ γ|11〉+ |22〉) (53)
for γ ≈ 0.9875. This state is close to, but certainly dif-
ferent from, the maximally entangled state. Thus, the
secret key rate exhibits the same form of anomaly as
all the other measures of non-locality known to date [45]:
maximal non-locality is obtained with non-maximally en-
tangled states.
We consider now Bob’s pre-processing. For one-way
post-processing, dit-wise pre-processing is already opti-
mal. A priori, one can define two different flipping prob-
abilities q+1 and q−1, associated respectively to b→ b+1
and b → b + 2. But it turns out by inspection that the
optimal is always obtained for q+1 = q−1 = q, so we write
down directly this case. From (51) it is clear that after
pre-processing
e′AB(+1) = e
′
AB(−1) ≡
e′
2
=
1− p0
2
+ q
3p0 − 1
2
(54)
whence
I(A : B′) = 1− h
(
[1− e′, e
′
2
,
e′
2
]
)
. (55)
Eve’s information is computed by recalling that, for any
local point she sends out, before pre-processing (i) for
one value of x, she knows perfectly Bob’s symbol b; (ii)
for the other value of x, she hesitates between two val-
ues of b. Pre-processing leaves b unchanged with prob-
ability 1 − 2q, and sends it to b ± 1 with probability q
each. Therefore, in case (i), Eve’s information is low-
ered from 1 to 1 − h([1 − 2q, q, q]) ≡ 1 − h1(q); in case
(ii), Eve’s information is lowered from 1 − h([ 12 , 12 , 0])
to 1 − h([ 1−q2 , 1−q2 , q]) ≡ 1 − h2(q). Since each case is
equiprobable,
I(E : B′) = 1− 1
2
[h1(q) + h2(q)] . (56)
From (55) and (56), we can compute rCK by optimizing
the value of q. We did the optimization numerically. The
improvement due to pre-processing is clear in Fig. 4.
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3. Two-way classical post-processing
We have also studied the possibility of extracting a
secret key from the correlations of Table V using AD
(without pre-processing). Alice selects N of her symbols
that are identical, Bob accepts if and only if his cor-
responding symbols are also identical. The probability
that Bob accepts is pN0 + [eAB(+1)]
N + [eAB(−1)]N , and
consequently
e˜AB(±1) =
(
1−p0
2
)N
pN0 + 2
(
1−p0
2
)N ≈
(
1− p0
2p0
)N
. (57)
As in the case d = 2, Eve has to make a random guess if
and only if she has sent PR2,3 for all the N instances:
e˜E(±1) >∼
1
3
(
pNL
p0
)N
. (58)
Thus, a secret key can be extracted using AD as long as
pNL >
1−p0
2 , that is as long as
5p0 > 4p1 + 3 . (59)
The limiting curve is also plotted in Fig. 4. Its extremal
points are pNL >
1
5 for p1 = 0 (the same value as ob-
tained for d = 2) and pNL >
1
9 for p2 = 0.
4. Intrinsic information
It is straightforward to generalize the map used above
in the computation of the intrinsic information to the
d = 3 case. Looking at table V, one has to map all the
symbols (i, ?2) into (?, ?), where i = 0, 1, 2. The obtained
conditional mutual information reads
I(A : B|E¯) = P (?, ?) ×[
1− h
(
2p0 − pL
2− pL ,
1− p0
2− pL ,
1− p0
2− pL
)]
. (60)
This is of course an upper bound to the intrinsic informa-
tion, since the employed map may not be the optimal one.
Contrary to what happens in the d = 2 case, this quantity
vanishes for some points inside the region of Bell viola-
tion! Indeed, Eq. (60) is zero on the line 5p0−2p1−3 = 0;
by changing slightly Eve’s map (specifically, she applies
the map above only with a suitable probability and makes
nothing in the other cases), it can be verified that the in-
trinsic information is zero also below the line, that is for
5p0 − 2p1 − 3 ≤ 0 . (61)
This region overlaps with the non-local region (Fig. 4).
D. Secret key extraction: generic d
For generic d, we want to prove that secrecy can be
generated using quantum states. The statistics Alice-Bob
can be computed using quantum mechanics, in particular
the error rates eAB(∆) of Eq. (47). The question is, how
to estimate Eve’s information: to compute this quan-
tity exactly, one must describe the points in the CGLMP
facet in some detail. However, some interesting bound
can be derived from what we have already said and the
intuition developed in the study of d = 3.
Consider first one-way post-processing: the discussion
of paragraph IVB2 implies the bound
I(B : E) ≤ IE ≡ pL
2
+
pL
2
(1− logd 2) . (62)
The bound is reached if and only if Eve distributes strate-
gies that belong to L, as it happened to be always pos-
sible for d = 3. Moreover, this bound can also be
computed from the Alice-Bob distribution only assum-
ing (48). Consequently we can estimate
RCK(q = 0) ≥ r ≡ 1− h ({eAB(∆)}∆)− IE (63)
with h the Shannon entropy measured in dits. We have
studied the r.h.s. numerically for d ≤ 10, for cor-
relations in the quantum region obtained from states
that are Schmidt-diagonal in the computational basis,
|ψ〉 = ∑d−1k=0 ck|k k〉. The general features that emerge
are:
• The maximal value of R achievable in the quantum
region increases with d, reaching up to R ≈ 0.692
bits for d = 10.
• The quantum state corresponding to the maximal
value of R is always such that ck = cd−1−k. It
seems that the overlap η of this state with the max-
imally entangled one decreases with d, but the de-
crease is very slow (we have η = 1 for d = 2, and
for d = 10 we still have η >∼ 0.998).
A similar simple approach can be found to explore the
possibilities of two-way post-processing. We have
e˜AB(∆) ∼ [eAB(∆)]N ≤
[
max
∆=1,...,d−1
eAB(∆)
]N
(64)
and Eve’s error is e˜E ∼ 1d pNNL. Consequently, AD will
certainly work for
pNL > max
∆=1,...,d−1
eAB(∆) . (65)
All the quantities in this relation can be computed from
the Alice-Bob correlations alone. As before, we have
studied this condition numerically, for d ≤ 100. This
time, we have concentrated on correlations of the form
P = wPme +
(1−w)
d , where Pme are the correlations
obtained when measuring the maximally entangled state
(this is of course a completely arbitrary choice, but seems
interesting from the point of view of quantum physics).
15
One observes that, as expected, the use of two-way post-
processing significantly decreases the value pNL(0) of
pNL for which no secrecy can be extracted. Moreover,
pNL(0) decreases when d increases, but very slowly; so
slowly in fact, that it cannot be guessed from the numer-
ical results whether ultimately pNL(0)→ 0 for d→∞.
In summary, we have obtained a few results for generic
d. In spite of a large number of assumptions and approx-
imations (not least the choice of the protocol), we can
conjecture that secrecy can be extracted from quantum
non-local correlations for any d; and more precisely, that
the amount of extractable secrecy increases with increas-
ing d.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In conclusion, we have presented a first approach to a
device-independent security proof for cryptography, ex-
panding and generalizing the work of Ref. [4]. Under the
assumption of individual attacks, we have proved that
a secret key can be extracted from some no-signalling
probability distributions, using only the very fact that
they violate a Bell-type inequality and cannot therefore
originate from shared randomness. In particular, noisy
quantum states can be used to distribute correlations,
that are non-local enough to contain distillable secrecy:
so our result is also of practical interest.
We’d like to finish by raising some of the questions and
perspectives that are opened by this work.
• A first objective is to extend our analysis beyond
the assumption of individual attacks, proving ul-
timately the security against the most general at-
tacks by an eavesdropper limited by no-signalling.
A first step in this direction has been recently de-
rived [36].
• One can make a step further: can one make a
device-independent proof of security against an
eavesdropper which would be limited by quantum
physics? On the side of Alice and Bob, non-locality
should still be the physical basis for security, be-
cause there exist no other entanglement witness
which works independently of the dimension of the
Hilbert space. On the side of Eve, the requirement
that she must respect quantum physics is a limi-
tation, compared to power we gave her in this pa-
per; so one can hope to obtain a device-independent
proof with better bounds.
• In this paper, we have defined protocols which look
as ”natural” for the CHSH and the CGLMP in-
equalities. But there is no claim of optimality. In
fact, it is not even proved that the pseudo-sifting
that we have used is the best way of extracting se-
crecy from the raw correlations of CHSH-like mea-
surements (Table I). Other protocols may be bet-
ter suited for cryptographic tasks, as discussed in
Ref. [37].
• A particular consequence of the previous item is
worth mentioning in itself. On the one hand, it
has been proved that all non-local probability dis-
tributions have positive intrinsic information [25].
On the other hand, as mentioned several times in
this paper, we have not been able to find an ex-
plicit procedure for extracting a secret key in the
whole non-local region. This means, either that a
better procedure does exist, or that non-local dis-
tributions close to the local limit provide examples
of bipartite bound information [29,30].
• A technical open point, which we mentioned and
would be very meaningful for the present studies,
is the characterization of the quantum region in
probability space for a given number of inputs and
outcomes.
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APPENDIX A: LOWER BOUND FOR A
QUANTUM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHSH
PROTOCOL
In this appendix, we study the security of the CHSH
protocol in the standard scenario where Eve is limited
by the quantum formalism, and Alice and Bob have a
perfect knowledge on their quantum devices. More pre-
cisely, Alice and Bob know their Hilbert spaces are two-
dimensional and they apply the spin measurements that
produce the largest Bell violation for the noiseless state
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉). For instance, Alice and Bob
measure in the xz plane, their spin measurement being
defined by the angle θ with the z axis on the Poincare´
sphere. Alice measures in the θ = π/2 and θ = 0
bases, corresponding to x = 0, 1 respectively, while Bob
does it in the θ = π/4, 3π/4 directions, corresponding to
y = 0, 1.
As shown in Refs [38,39], the bound for security against
the most general attacks (”unconditional security”) can
be computed by focusing on ”collective attacks”, where
Eve prepares the same two-qubit state ρAB on all in-
stances, but is allowed to make a coherent measurement
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of her ancillae after error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation.
By inspection, or by using the formalism developed in
Ref. [38], it can be proved that Eve’s optimal strategy
uses a Bell-diagonal state of the form
ρAB = λ1Φ
+ + λ2(Φ
− +Ψ+) + λ4Ψ−, (A1)
where Φ± and Ψ± denote the projectors onto the Bell
basis
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (A2)
By assumption, Eve holds a purification of each pair: be-
fore any measurement, the quantum correlations among
Alice, Bob and Eve are described by the pure state
|ψABE〉⊗N where ρAB = trE |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE .
In the CHSH protocol, Alice and Bob’s bases do not
perfectly overlap: their outcomes are therefore not per-
fectly correlated even in the case λ1 = 1 (perfect channel,
no Eve): actually, the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
in this case is Q0 = sin
2(π/8) = 12
(
1− 1√
2
)
. For
the same channel, the BB84 protocol has zero QBER.
In the light of this, the meaningful parameter to com-
pare the two protocols should not be the QBER, but
a measure of the quality of the channel. We use the
disturbance, that is the probability that measurement
outcomes in the same basis agree: in our case, D =
〈+z,−z|ρAB|+ z,−z〉+〈−z,+z|ρAB| − z,+z〉 = λ2+λ4.
Now, Alice and Bob measure their local systems, while
Eve keeps her quantum state. In this scenario, a lower
bound to the key rate distillable using one-way commu-
nication protocols has been obtained in [40],
R→ ≥ RDW = I(A : B)− χ(B : E). (A3)
Here, I(A : B) denotes the standard mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob’s classical outcomes, while
χ(B : E) is the Holevo quantity for the effective channel
between Bob and Eve. Indeed, Bob’s measurement out-
come prepares a quantum state on Eve’s site (see [40] for
more details). Contrary to the more standard situation,
Eve does not know which measurement Bob has applied,
so she has to sum over the two possibilities. Her states
read, up to normalization,
ρiE = trAB
[
1 ⊗
(
|i〉〈i|π/4 + |i〉〈i|3π/4
)
⊗ 1 |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE
]
,
(A4)
where i = 0, 1 and |i〉θ denote the basis elements in the
direction specified by θ, as above. It is straightforward
to see that for the CHSH protocol
I(A : B) = 1− h
(
1 + (λ1 − λ4)/
√
2
2
)
. (A5)
The computation of χ(B : E) = S(ρE) − (S(ρ0E) +
S(ρ1E))/2, where S(ρ) denotes the von Neumann entropy
for a state ρ, is slightly more involved. However, after
some patient algebra one can see that the maximum of
this quantity is obtained, for fixed disturbance, when
λ1 = (1−D)2 λ2 = D(1 −D) λ4 = D2, (A6)
which defines Eve’s optimal attack. Not surprisingly, this
attack corresponds to a phase covariant cloning machine
(see for instance [41]), that optimally clones all the states
in the xz plane. This attack is also optimal for the stan-
dard BB84 protocol.
The obtained critical disturbance for CHSH is D ≈
12%. This is larger than the well-known Shor-Preskill
bound D ≈ 11% for security of BB84 [42]. This bound,
however, has recently been improved by allowing any of
the parties, say Alice, to introduce some pre-processing
of her outcome before the reconciliation [38]. Alice then
flips her bit with probability q. This local noise worsens
the correlations between Alice and Bob but it deterio-
rates in a stronger way the correlations between Alice
and Eve. For any value of the disturbance there exists
an optimal pre-processing q(D), depending on the pro-
tocol, which maximizes the key rate. This explains the
improvement on the critical disturbance that moves up
to D ≈ 12.4% both for BB84 and for the CHSH protocol
described here.
Actually, the close relation between the CHSH pro-
tocol and the BB84 protocol is made clear by this pre-
processing. Let QB ≡ D and qB be respectively the
QBER and the pre-processing rate for BB84; and QC
and qC denote the same quantities for the CHSH proto-
col. Note first that the channel defined in (A6) induces
a QBER QB = D in BB84, and a QBER QC = Q0+
D√
2
for the CHSH protocol; whence
QB =
√
2(QC −Q0) . (A7)
It can then be shown that RCHSHDW (QC , qC) =
RBB84DW (QB, qB) when the QBERs are related as (A7) and
when
qB = Q0 +
qC√
2
. (A8)
These two relations imply
Q′ = QC(1 − qC) + (1 −QC)qC
= QB(1− qB) + (1−QB)qB . (A9)
Consider first for clarity the case qC = 0: the error
in CHSH due to the non-perfect overlap of the bases
can be attributed to the application of a pre-processing
qB = Q0 onto the correlations obtained with perfectly
overlapping bases (indeed, the errors Q0 are intrinsic to
the protocol, and Eve cannot gain anything from them).
In general, the rates obtained for the CHSH protocol
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in the standard quantum scenario coincide with those
derived for the BB84 protocol when the pre-processing
is optimized under the constraint qB ≥ Q0. If we
now compare RCHSHDW (QC) and R
BB84
DW (QB) for a fixed
value of D [that is, (A7) holds] and choosing the op-
timal pre-processing in each case, we find the follow-
ing. For small error rates, the optimal pre-processing
on BB84 is smaller than Q0; in other words, even for
qC = 0 CHSH corresponds to BB84 with an excessive pre-
processing, whence RCHSHDW (QC) < R
BB84
DW (QB). The op-
timal pre-processing on BB84 becomes equal to Q0 for
D ≈ 11.7%; from this point on, the optimal qC is larger
than zero, and the rates for the two protocols become
identical: RCHSHDW (QC) = R
BB84
DW (QB). In particular, as
announced, both become zero for D ≈ 12.4%.
APPENDIX B: THE CGLMP INEQUALITY IN
QUANTUM PHYSICS
The CGLMP inequalities [33] have been the object of
several studies in the context of quantum physics. Here
we summarize the results without any proof.
One unexpected features of CGLMP is the fact that
the maximal violation is not reached by measurements
on the maximally entangled state [43]. Also unexpected
is the fact that the settings that maximize the violation
are the same for a wide class of states (including the max-
imal entangled one and the one which gives the maximal
violation). These are the settings we consider here. We
label them A0 and A1 for Alice, B0 and B1 for Bob:
Ax ≡ {Ψx(a)}d−1a=0 , Ψx(a) =
d−1∑
k=0
ei
2pi
d
ak
√
d
(
eikφx |k〉) , (B1)
By ≡ {Φy(b)}d−1b=0 , Φy(b) =
d−1∑
k=0
e−i
2pi
d
bk
√
d
(
eikθy |k〉) . (B2)
In operational terms, both Alice and Bob apply first
global phases in the computational basis, then make a
quantum Fourier transform (Bob makes the inverse as
Alice), and finally measure in the new basis and outcome
the value a or b.
Consider quantum states that are Schmidt-diagonal in
the computational basis:
|ψ〉 =
d−1∑
k=0
ck |k k〉 (B3)
with ck ∈ R: on this family, one finds
P (a, b|x, y) = 1
d2
d−1∑
k,k′=0
ckck′ ×
cos
[(
2π
d
∆+ φx + θy
)
(k − k′)
]
(B4)
with ∆ = a − b. The only freedom left is the choice of
the four angles φx and θy. The settings we are interested
in are defined by
φ0 = 0 , φ1 =
π
d
; θ0 = − π
2d
, θ1 =
π
2d
. (B5)
With these settings, (44) holds.
For the case d = 3, all the interesting states found
to date are of the form (53). For instance, γ = 1 is
the maximally entangled state; the maximal violation
is obtained for γ =
√
11−√3
2 ≈ 0.7923 [43]; the largest
Kullback-Leibler distance from the set of local distribu-
tions is obtained for γ ≈ 0.6529 [44]; and we have shown
above (IVC) that the maximal amount of secret key rate
under one-way processing is found for γ ≈ 0.9875. For
the states |ψ(γ)〉, the p∆ = P (a,∆− a|0, 0) are:
p0 =
1
3
(
1 + 1+2
√
3γ
2+γ2
)
,
p1 =
1
3
(
1− 22+γ2
)
,
p2 =
1
3
(
1 + 1−2
√
3γ
2+γ2
)
.
(B6)
APPENDIX C: DEPOLARIZATION FOR
ARBITRARY D
1. The procedure
Suppose Alice and Bob share initially an arbitrary no-
signalling probability distribution P (a, b|x, y). The de-
polarization procedure that brings P in the slice defined
by (44) is very similar to the one described in Ref. [25]
for d = 2. It consists of two steps.
Step 1. Alice chooses k
R∈ {0, ..., d−1} with probability
1
d and communicates it to Bob on a public channel. Both
Alice and Bob perform
a −→ a+ k
b −→ b+ k . (C1)
This implements P → P1 which is such that
P1(a, b|x, y) = 1d
∑
k P (a + k, b + k|x, y) and is conse-
quently a function only of ∆ = a− b.
Step 2. With probability 14 , Alice chooses one of the
following four procedures and asks Bob on the public
channel to act accordingly:
Proc1 :
A : do nothing
B : do nothing
Proc2 :
A : x→ x¯, a→ −a
B : b→ −b+ y
Proc3 :
A : a→ −a− x
B : y → y¯, b→ −b
Proc4 :
A : x→ x¯, a→ a+ x
B : y → y¯, b→ b+ y¯
(C2)
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where we have written x¯ = 1 − x. This implements
P1 −→ P2 such that
4P2(a, b|0, 0) = P1(a, b|0, 0) + P1(−a,−b|0, 1)
+P1(−a,−b|1, 0) + P1(a, b+ 1|1, 1)
4P2(a, b|0, 1) = P1(a, b|0, 1) + P1(−a,−b+ 1|1, 1)
+P1(−a,−b|0, 0) + P1(a, b|1, 0)
4P2(a, b|1, 0) = P1(a, b|1, 0) + P1(−a− 1,−b|1, 1)
+P1(−a,−b|0, 0) + P1(a+ 1, b+ 1|0, 1)
4P2(a, b|1, 1) = P1(a, b|1, 1) + P1(−a,−b+ 1|0, 1)
+P1(−a− 1,−b|1, 0) + P1(a+ 1, b|0, 0) .
Because of the symmetry of P1, this implies
P2(a, b|0, 0) = P2(−a,−b|0, 1) = P2(−a,−b|1, 0) =
P2(a, b + 1|1, 1) which is nothing but the definition of
the slice (44).
2. Examples
We said in the main text that none of the extremal
points of the form PR2,d′ , with d
′ < d, is on the slice.
Let’s then consider a realization of PR2,d′ , the one whose
array is
Pˆ (d′) =
1
d′
A \B 1 0 1 0
1 1 d′ 0 1 d′ 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 d′ 0 Ud′ 0
0 0 0 0 0
(C3)
where boldface numbers indicate arrays containing all
ones or all zeros, 1 d′ is the identity matrix of dimension
d′ × d′, and where Ud′ is the d′ × d′ matrix
Ud′ =


0 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 1 0
...
...
. . .
0 0 0 0 · · · 1
1 0 0 0 · · · 0


. (C4)
The arrays (39) and (C3) allow to compute immediately
the ”scalar product”
〈
Id, Pˆ (d
′)
〉
= 1− 1
d′
(C5)
generalizing the results we gave in the main text for
d′ = 2 and d′ = d.
By following the steps of the depolarization protocol,
one finds that Pˆ (d′) goes to the distribution in the slice
which is given by
Pˆ (d′) −→ Pˆ2(d′) ≡
{
p0 = 1− 14d′
pd′ =
1
4d′
(C6)
and obviously all the other pf are zero. Using (48), one
can verify that
〈
Id, Pˆ2(d
′)
〉
= 1− 1d′ : the violation is pre-
served. As we said in the main text, this is not peculiar
to this example, but is a general feature, as we show in
the next paragraph.
3. Preservation of the violation of CGLMP
We want to prove that this depolarization preserves
the violation of the CGLMP inequality, that is
〈Id, P2〉 = 〈Id, P 〉 . (C7)
The easiest way is to write down Id as it appeared in the
original paper [33], namely I˜d ≤ 2 with
I˜d =
[d/2]−1∑
k=0
(
1− 2k
d− 1
) {[
P (−k|0, 0) + P (k|0, 1)
+P (k|1, 0) + P (−k − 1|1, 1)]− [P (k + 1|0, 0)
+P (−k − 1|0, 1) + P (−k − 1|1, 0) + P (k|1, 1)]}
where P (∆|x, y) ≡ P (a− b = ∆|x, y). The link between
I˜d and our definition of Id is provided by
Id =
d− 1
2d
(
−2 + I˜d
)
. (C8)
Using the expression of I˜d, the proof is straightforward.
In fact, Step 1 keeps by definition all the P (∆|x, y) con-
stant, while Step 2 keeps both sums in [...] constant.
APPENDIX D: DETERMINISTIC STRATEGIES
THAT SATURATE CGLMP
We present here a more detailed study of the extremal
points that lie on the CGLMP facet, completing what
has been written in paragraph IVB2.
Consider the array which represents the CGLMP in-
equality Id ≤ 0, eq. (39); here, it is more convenient to
look at it as having 2d × 2d entries [35]. Let I[i, j] de-
note an entry of this array. For the deterministic strategy{
a(0), a(1); b(0), b(1)
}
, the value of CGLMP is simply
Id = −2 +
1∑
x,y=0
I[a(x), b(y)]
= −2 + δ[b(0) ≥ a(0)] + δ[a(0) ≥ b(1)]
+δ[a(1) ≥ b(0)]− δ[a(1) ≥ b(1)] (D1)
where the −2 comes from the marginals of a(0) and b(0),
and where δ[C] is equal to 1 if condition C is satisfied
and to 0 otherwise. The inequality is saturated by all
the strategies such that Id = 0.
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Consider the points such that b(0) = b(1): the last two
conditions become equal and the δ’s compensate each
other for all a(1), so the only way to saturate the inequal-
ity is to fulfill both b(0) ≥ a(0) and a(0) ≥ b(1) = b(0);
whence a(0) = b(0) = b(1) as announced in the main
text. The proof of the analog statement in the case
b(0) = b(1)− 1 is similarly done by inspection. One first
considers b(0) < d−1: in this case, b(1) > b(0), therefore
the first two conditions cannot be both fulfilled, what-
ever a(0) is. One can then easily verify that only the
choice a(1) = b(0) leads to a saturation of the inequality.
The last remaining case is b(0) = d − 1, b(1) = 0: it can
be read directly from the array, and leads to the same
conclusion.
So, we have proved the properties of sets L0 and L1,
which consist of d2 points each; we still have to prove
that the number of points on the facet is larger than
D = 4d(d − 1). This is easily done by noticing the fol-
lowing: the four ”natural” relations associated to the
CGLMP inequality, those that are simultaneously ful-
filled by PR2,d, are:
R00 : a(0) = b(0)
R01 : a(0) = b(1)
R10 : a(1) = b(0)
R11 : a(1) = b(1)− 1 .
(D2)
Because of the specific pseudo-sifting of our crypto-
graphic protocol, we grouped them by pairs according
to Alice’s input. But from the standpoint of the inequal-
ity, any pairwise grouping is equally meaningful. It can
indeed be easily verified using (D1) that all the points
that fulfill at least two among these relations saturate the
inequality. There are therefore 4d strategies that fulfill
three relations, and 6d(d − 2) strategies that fulfill ex-
actly two relations. In conclusion, by looking only at the
points that fulfill at least two among the four relations
(D2), we have already 6d2 − 8d deterministic points on
the CGLMP facet, and this number is larger than D for
d > 2. We note that the list is exhaustive for d = 3 (see
Appendix E), but not in general. For instance, for d ≥ 5,
the strategy
{
a(0) = 4, a(1) = 1; b(0) = 5, b(1) = 3
}
ful-
fills none of the relations (D2), but achieves nevertheless
Id = 0.
APPENDIX E: EXPLICIT ANALYSIS FOR D = 3
1. Deterministic strategies on the facet
We give here the explicit list of the 30 deterministic
strategies that saturate CGLMP. We note r = 0, 1, 2.
The twelve strategies in L3 are
L30 :
{
Lr3,1 = {a(x) = r, b(y) = r}
Lr3,2 = {a(x) = r − x, b(y) = r} (E1)
L31 :
{
Lr3,3 = {a(x) = r, b(y) = r + y}
Lr3,4 = {a(x) = r − x, b(y) = r + y − 1} . (E2)
The six strategies in L2 are
L20 : Lr2,1 = {a(x) = r + x, b(y) = r} (E3)
L21 : Lr2,2 = {a(x) = r + x, b(y) = r + y + 1} . (E4)
The twelve strategies outside L are:
Lre,1 = {a(x) = r, b(y) = r − y}
Lre,2 = {a(x) = r + x, b(y) = r − y}
Lre,3 = {a(x) = r + x, b(y) = r − y + 1}
Lre,4 = {a(x) = r − x, b(y) = r − y + 1} .
(E5)
As we said in the main text, the decomposition of M2
given in (50) is only one possible decomposition, the one
which optimizes Eve’s information on Bob’s symbol. It
can checked that the general decomposition is defined by
M2 :
pr3,j = 0 ,
pr2,1 = p
r
2,2 ≡ pr2 free,
pre,1 free,
pre,2 =
1
6 − (pr2 + pre,1) ,
pre,3 = p
r+1
e,1 ,
pre,4 =
1
6 − (pr2 + pr+1e,1 ) .
(E6)
There are thus six free parameters {pr2, pre,1}, constrained
of course by the positivity of probabilities (in particular,
none of these parameters can exceed 16 ). A possible real-
ization of M2 is the equiprobable mixture of the eighteen
points which are not in L3. The choice leading to (50) is
the equiprobable mixture of the six points in L2 (pr2 = 16 ,
implying automatically pre,j = 0).
2. Alice-Bob-Eve correlations
Having the explicit deterministic strategies, it is a mat-
ter of patience to derive the Tables for the correlations
Alice-Bob-Eve. The result is given in Table VI, in which
we have introduced the notations
f(p) =
2p1
3
+ 2p2p , g(p) =
1− p0
3
− 2p2p . (E7)
Note that, in each of the nine cells, the sum of the prob-
abilities does not depend on the pr2, as it should: the
decomposition of M2 is known only to Eve. Eve is obvi-
ously interested in maximizing the probability of know-
ing both symbols, measured by f(p); whence the choice
pr2 =
1
6 made in the main text.
3. About non-local points that violate CGLMP
Here, we want to list some non-local points other than
PR2,3, that violate CGLMP, and study their relation
with the slice (44).
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Consider first the non-local points equivalent to
PR2,2 ≡ PR. There are 24 such points in the no-
signalling polytope: in fact, there a three choices for the
two outcomes [(0,1), (0,2) or (1,2)] and for each choice
there are eight PR-like points, obtained as usual by rela-
belling inputs and/or outputs. By inspection, it can be
seen that I3 > 0 (in fact, I3 =
1
2 ) for our representative
(39) of I3, is achieved only by three PR-like points: those
defined by
{
a = b if xy = 0
a 6= b if xy = 1 for (a, b) ∈


(0, 1)
(0, 2)
(1, 2)
. (E8)
It is readily seen that no mixture of these three strategies
can belong to the slice (44): to obtain all the marginals
equal to 13 , the only possible mixture is the equiprobable
one. This one reads
MPR =
1
3
A \B 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 12
1 0 1 12 0
(E9)
and is clearly not of the form (45). This negative result is
important for our study: had such a mixture belonged to
the slice, Eve would have sent these non-local points, for
which she would have gained some information (because
in each case one result is impossible).
Actually, there is a mixture of non-local points on
the slice: it is a mixture of other PR2,3-like strategies,
which optimize the violation of different representatives
of CGLMP, and violate our representative by I3 =
1
3 .
The strategies are those in which b − a is equal to −xy,
x(2−y), y(2−x) and (x+y+1)mod2 (note that this last
one is indeed a PR2,3: the non-locality is embedded on
the fact that the r.h.s. is computed modulo 2, instead of
modulo 3 as is the case for the others). The equiprobable
mixture of these four strategies is the point p0 =
3
4 and
p1 = 0 in the slice. Obviously, Eve has no interest in
sending these strategies instead of the PR2,3 which gives
the maximal violation: in all cases, she is going to learn
nothing about the outcomes.
APPENDIX: TABLES
A \ B y = 0, b = 0 y = 0, b = 1 y = 1, b = 0 y = 1, b = 1
x = 0, pNL/2 (PR) pNL/2 (PR)
a = 0 p01 (L
0
1) p
0
1 (L
0
1)
p02 (L
0
2) p
0
2 (L
0
2)
p03 (L
0
3) p
0
4 (L
0
4) p
0
4 (L
0
4) p
0
3 (L
0
3)
x = 0, pNL/2 (PR) pNL/2 (PR)
a = 1 p11 (L
1
1) p
1
1 (L
1
1)
p12 (L
1
2) p
1
2 (L
1
2)
p14 (L
1
4) p
1
3 (L
1
3) p
1
3 (L
1
3) p
1
4 (L
1
4)
x = 1, pNL/2 (PR) pNL/2 (PR)
a = 0 p01 (L
0
1) p
1
2 (L
1
2) p
0
1 (L
0
1) p
1
2 (L
1
2)
p03 (L
0
3) p
0
3 (L
0
3)
p14 (L
1
4) p
1
4 (L
1
4)
x = 1, pNL/2 (PR) pNL/2 (PR)
a = 1 p02 (L
0
2) p
1
1 (L
1
1) p
0
2 (L
0
2) p
1
1 (L
1
1)
p13 (L
1
3) p
1
3 (L
1
3)
p04 (L
0
4) p
0
4 (L
0
4)
TABLE I. Table of the distribution Alice-Bob-Eve for the
raw data. The entries are the P (a, b|x, y). In parentheses, we
indicate Eve’s symbol.
x = 0 b = 0 b = 1
a = 0 pNL/2 (PR)
p01 (L
0
1)
p02 (L
0
2)
p03ξ0 (L
0
3) p
0
3ξ1 (L
0
3)
p04ξ1 (L
0
4) p
0
4ξ0 (L
0
4)
a = 1 pNL/2 (PR)
p11 (L
1
1)
p12 (L
1
2)
p13ξ1 (L
1
3) p
1
3ξ0 (L
1
3)
p14ξ0 (L
1
4) p
1
4ξ1 (L
1
4)
x = 1 b = 0 b = 1
a = 0 pNL/2 (PR)
p01ξ0 (L
0
1) p
0
1ξ1 (L
0
1)
p12ξ1 (L
1
2) p
1
2ξ0 (L
1
2)
p03 (L
0
3)
p14 (L
1
4)
a = 1 pNL/2 (PR)
p11ξ1 (L
1
1) p
1
1ξ0 (L
1
1)
p02ξ0 (L
0
2) p
0
2ξ1 (L
0
2)
p31 (L
3
1)
p04 (L
0
4)
TABLE II. Probability distributions Alice-Bob-Eve for the
data after the pseudo-sifting of the CHSH protocol, condi-
tioned to the knowledge of x = 0 or x = 1.
[isotropic] b = 0 b = 1
a = 0 pNL/2 (?, ?)
pL/4 (0, 0)
pL/8 (0, ?) pL/8 (0, ?)
a = 1 pNL/2 (?, ?)
pL/4 (1, 1)
pL/8 (1, ?) pL/8 (1, ?)
TABLE III. Probability distribution Alice-Bob-Eve for the
CHSH protocol, in the case of isotropic distribution.
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b = 0 b = 1
a = 0 pNL
2
(q¯Aq¯B + qAqB) (?, ?)
pNL
2
(qAq¯B + q¯AqB) (?, ?)
pL
4
q¯Aq¯B (0, 0)
pL
4
q¯AqB (0, 0)
pL
4
qAqB (1, 1)
pL
4
qAq¯B (1, 1)
pL
8
q¯A (0, ?)
pL
8
q¯A (0, ?)
pL
8
qA (1, ?)
pL
8
qA (1, ?)
a = 1 pNL
2
(qAq¯B + q¯AqB) (?, ?)
pNL
2
(q¯Aq¯B + qAqB) (?, ?)
pL
4
qAq¯B (0, 0)
pL
4
qAqB (0, 0)
pL
4
q¯AqB (1, 1)
pL
4
q¯Aq¯B (1, 1)
pL
8
qA (0, ?)
pL
8
qA (0, ?)
pL
8
q¯A (1, ?)
pL
8
q¯A (1, ?)
TABLE IV. Probability distribution Alice-Bob-Eve, in
the case of isotropic distribution, after Alice’s and Bob’s
pre-processing.
b = 0 b = 1 b = 2
a = 0 pNL/3 (?, ?)
pL
6
(0, 0)
pL
12
− p2
6
(0, ?2)
1−p0
6
(0, ?2)
1−p0
6
(0, ?2)
a = 1 pNL/3 (?, ?)
pL
6
(1, 1)
1−p0
6
(1, ?2)
pL
12
− p2
6
(1, ?2)
1−p0
6
(1, ?2)
a = 2 pNL/3 (?, ?)
pL
6
(2, 2)
1−p0
6
(2, ?2)
1−p0
6
(2, ?2)
pL
12
− p2
6
(2, ?2)
TABLE V. Probability distribution Alice-Bob-Eve for
d = 3, after pseudo-sifting, assuming decomposition (50) for
M2. We indicate by ?2 the case where Eve hesitates among
two values of Bob’s symbol (instead of three).
x b = 0 b = 1 b = 2
a = 0 pNL/3 (?, ?)
f(p0−x
2
) (0, 0)
g(p0−x
2
) (0, ?2)
1−p0
6
(0, ?2)
1−p0
6
(0, ?2)
a = 1 pNL/3 (?, ?)
f(p1−x
2
) (1, 1)
1−p0
6
(1, ?2) g(p
1−x
2
) (1, ?2)
1−p0
6
(1, ?2)
a = 2 pNL/3 (?, ?)
f(p2−x
2
) (2, 2)
1−p0
6
(2, ?2)
1−p0
6
(2, ?2) g(p
2−x
2
) (2, ?2)
TABLE VI. Probability distribution Alice-Bob-Eve after
pseudo-sifting for d = 3 and Alice’s setting x, for the general
decomposition (E6) of M2.
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